Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense

Alvin Plantinga is a philosopher that developed what is known as the “Free Will Defense” to address the Problem of Evil.

The Problem of Evil has been attributed to the Greek philosopher Epicurus and is typically quoted as follows:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? If he is neither able nor willing, then why call him God?”

Plantinga’s summarizes his defense as follows:

“A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but he can’t cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if he does so, then they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, he must create creatures capable of moral evil; and he can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so.”

Get it?

It seems that most philosophers accept Plantinga’s argument as resolving the Problem of Evil.

A number of noted philosophers, including Anthony Flew, disagree and have criticized the argument because it assumes what is known as an “incompatibilist view” which postulates that free will and determinism are incompatible. Apparently they hold that “free will” and determinism are compatible.

I don’t buy that one. I have to admit that I consider free will and determinism incompatible so I’m not impressed with that criticism.

So, is the Problem of Evil resolved?

No, for three reasons. First, let’s consider the proposition “A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all.”

What would be more valuable, a world were 51% of the freely performed actions were morally good or a world where 52% of the actions were morally good? What about 52% versus 53%? 53% versus 54%?

Allow me to suggest that the fewer the number of evil actions, the more valuable the world. Given unlimited resources, I could create an environment for people where they may still retain the ability to do evil, but it would be extremely unlikely they would choose to do so because there would be no need.

If I were a God, I think I would also refrain from creating sociopaths or psychopaths who are almost guaranteed to do evil.

Yet God apparently chooses not to do either of these things. Instead we get a world with limited resources. A world in which it is a struggle to simply survive, never mind be happy, and he chooses to create creatures virtually guaranteed to do evil.

Second, let’s consider the question of choosing to do evil versus the ability to execute that choice.

If I knew that someone had kidnapped a child with the intent of torturing and abusing that child and I was capable of taking action to prevent it, you can be damn sure I would prevent it. I think it’s safe to say that 99% of humanity, including those currently locked up for choosing to do evil, would prevent it as well.

The free choice has been made. By allowing the execution of that choice I maintain there is no added value. An omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God should know about the intended evil action, be capable of stopping the action and desire to stop the action. I suspect convincing the parents of the child that allowing the execution of the freely chosen evil action was more “valuable” would be a long, hard sell.

Third, and by far the most damning objection, is that Plantinga’s argument only accounts for “moral evil,” evil perpetrated by human beings. It does not address “Natural Evil” such as tornados, earthquakes and plagues.

Plantinga’s response to this objection is that it is possible that these things are caused by non-human creatures with free will. In other words, devils and demons and jinns oh my! My immediate reaction upon hearing this idiocy was to simply toss the whole argument into the trash. But that would have been a sort of reverse argument from authority. What is important is what is said, not who said it. Just because the source has some ideas too stupid to be taken seriously (don’t we all?) shouldn’t invalidate everything he says.

So, the bottom line is I’m not impressed. I may not be a philosopher (how does one become a philosopher anyway?) but I have my share of intelligence. Perhaps God could not have created a world with no evil, but he should have been able to do a hell of a lot better than he did.

One other question. If God cannot create a world with no evil, does that mean that there is evil in Heaven? If there is, why is it Heaven? If there isn’t, then Plantinga’s proposition is false isn’t it?